Tag Archives: eurozone

The Daily Threat Show and a taste of Greek clientelism

Now, most of you must have heard about the rumors. If SYRIZA wins the coming Greek elections, Greece will get out of the eurozone, the EU and might even be expelled out of the solar system. Here’s one of the official adverts by New Democracy, the right-wing chief opponent of SYRIZA.

(for English subtitles, press play, click the CC button on the YouTube player bar and choose English)

The video has been characterized as immoral for its use of children. Paradoxically, the classroom of the imaginary post-elections, SYRIZA-ruled, drachmaggedonized Greece looks much nicer than most of the classrooms in Greek schools today. The kids look healthy, no one is fainting because of malnutrition and, oh yes, they even have books! One might even think that we will be better off if we go back to the drachma.

Another video I wanted to post is a clip produced by New Democracy’s youth organization, ONNED. It’s a satire on Alexis Tsipras, SYRIZA’s leader.

So the EU and the eurozone is the expensive restaurant where we used to eat for free, enjoying fine French wine and blonde chicks in our Erasmus years. But the bill has come and we don’t want to pay it. Unfortunately, the producers have lost their contact with society. Greeks have stopped eating in fancy restaurants years ago (we’re soon to complete the 2nd year in the economic crisis) and for sure we won’t return there soon if New Democracy comes to power. For those who might think that I am a chief propagandist for SYRIZA, the only accurate thing in the video is Alexis’ swashbucklerness.

For those who are not convinced about New Democracy’s Greek old-school political practices, and about why nothing will change with the traditional parties in power no matter how much they express their regret for their old sins, here’s a video from a meeting of New Democracy members in the northern Greek region of Kilkis. The party’s chief campaigner in northern Greece, Panagiotis Psomiadis, is also present. He has a long history of accusations on corruption issues and had to step down from his post as Governor of the northern Greek region of Macedonia because of another scandal. That happened only several months after he was re-elected with 53% of the votes. If you wonder how this could be possible, see this great example of Greek state clientelism.

The Daily Threat Show – If SYRIZA wins… 2

Here are some internet memes on the possibility of a SYRIZA victory in the June 17 elections. They’re all from Greek TV channels.

SKAI TV – Nikos Evaggelatos presenting his news show

The headline says: The Earth might exit the solar system if SYRIZA forms a government

Mega Channel – Olga Tremi presenting the evening news

The headline says: The coming of the Antichrist is inevitable if we exit from the eurozone

Mega Channel – Olga Tremi presenting the evening news

The headline says: Bloodthirsty extraterrestrial zombies will be sucking our blood for a thousand years and then dead alive rapists will sodomize the carcasses of our soulless bodies if we exit from the eurozone.

A message of Hope for the Greek People: the case for a basic income

I received this message to the Greek people by Stanislas Jourdan, an independent journalist who until recently was working for French newspaper La Tribune. The text was originally posted here and I am reposting it here.

Defaulting on its debt and exiting the eurozone is certainly the best thing to do for Greece now. However, this won’t fix all the damages Greece experienced these last years of economical dictatorship. Greece needs more than that. Greece needs a new hope. I think what Greece needs is a basic income.

Let’s face it: far from preserving Greece from bankruptcy, European leaders are denying the simple fact that Greece is already a bankrupt country. Yet the Greek State cannot pay its hospitals’ medicine providers, delays VAT reimbursement, and even the central bank of Greece is printing euros to bail out insolvent banks.

More than never, now is time for a realistic diagnostic: if something might help Greece preserve its economy, defaulting on its debt burden is certainly the first step. Leaving the eurozone would be the second. If necessary, temporarily printing money to fill the budgetary gap, would be another possibility.

These three simple things would relieve every greek citizen from the repayement of an odious debt, it would lead to devaluation of the new drachma thus reinforcing competitivity of the Greek economy. In the end, this would supposedly tackle the vicious circle of economical depression. Theoritically, at least.

Practically, I know things are not so easy, and that these three steps raise a lot of different issues, and will not magically solve all the problems. So, how can we do better than that ? How can we build a better future in Greece, beyond the default ? How can we make this decision progressive and desirable ?

I am not Greek nor i am living there, however, through a lot of readings and some talks with Greek people, i think i have an idea about what is happening there. And I have been thinking of some part of a solution…

A confidence deficit

I feel that what Greece needs the most is much beyond economical measures. The most precious thing Greece has lost these last years is confidence. Confidence in itself, confidence towards others citizens, neighbours, confidence in the future, not to mention confidence in politicians.

This has to be fixed, but deeply relies on economical issues. You cannot ask people to trust each others when they are suffering from hard economical pressures. When you’re too poor to feed yourself or your children, well, things like morality, common sense, or citizenship becomes all relative. This is no more than a human thing, right ?

Moreover, confidence cannot be reached when people feel totally unequal towards some of their fellow citizens. There are studies (notably French ones) that prove this point: the more social welfare is unequal, the more people feel jealous and aren’t willing to play by the rules. They would try to take advantage of the system as much as they can and/or feel others are doing.

What i am saying is that Greece cannot get back on its feets as long as a new social contract is written democratically. And such a contract as to be built upon equality.

The basic income scenario

I don’t have any magic wand, but there is an idea that has been emerging for some years now, here in France, but in many other countries as well : the basic income guarantee. What’s that ? Basically, this consists in giving every citizen a monthly grant. Let say a minimum of 300€ a month for every Greek (this amount should be debated democratically). More from wikipedia:

A basic income guarantee is a proposed system of social security, that regularly provides each citizen with a sum of money. (…) Except for citizenship, a basic income is entirely unconditional. Furthermore, there is no means test; the richest as well as the poorest citizens would receive it.

In others words, if you earn a salary, you also earn the basic income. This detail is important: it means more incentives to work than just receiving the basic income. Of course, the richer actually reimburse the basic income they earn through taxes.

The counterpart of this basic income would be a removal of most of the current social grants, and (at least) a reduction of pensions grants, and unemployment allowances, thus downsizing the government intervention in terms of administration weight and bureaucracy. Also, this would imply big reforms towards a simplification of the greek fiscal system, perhaps with something like a flat tax.

Greece is in debt crisis, and i suggest to spend more?

Humm, yes and no. On the one hand, yes Greece needs a stimulus, on the other hand, the basic income should be funded partially through the transfer of existing budgets, thus not increasing the total budget of the Greek government, but rather optimizing it.

Now that said, i am not a specialist in the Greek economy and have no idea about the figures we are talking about. Defaulting on the public debt will probably help, but might not be sufficient. In this case, the central bank would to the rest.

Indeed, let’s not forget that if Greece were to exit the eurozone, Greece could then ask its central bank to print money and provide the funds this measure requires. I know this is a sensible topic for many economists, but before throwing me some Weimar-like arguments, please mind that Greece has been suffering from a big bank run for two years now, therefore deflation is more a threat than inflation right now. Growth is being slashed down because of a lack of money, not because of a lack of production factors.

And even though inflation were to rise, let’s not forget that giving a basic income to everyone, you are actually compensating the poorest from an hypothetical loss of purchasing power. Furthermore, in a situation where the government doesn’t manage to collect taxes properly, monetary-driven inflation is actually another way to tax people (the richer, by the way) and fund public spendings. As long as everyone truly benefit from the money you print (and not only the civil servants for instance), i think we can agree this is fair.

And at least, once in History, a central bank in the world would actually behave in favor of People and not only for banks and governments…

Greece badly needs a new Hope

I know this sounds like just another utopia. But this is a very serious proposal i have been advocating for, here in France for several years now.

And I am not alone supporting the idea. For many years, economists have been working on and defending such an idea (some of them, like James Tobin, got Nobel prices). Some countries such as Canada and the United States even experimented such a system. At a wider scale, Brazil also implemented a basic-income like system, called the Bolsa Familia. If you are curious, I highly recommend you to read some papers about these experiments: researchers not only found great results about economical output, but also in terms of Education, health and security issues.

Still, people keep on telling me « people will stop working ! ». And i say : « Of course, the others would ! But you wouldn’t, right ? ». Only once for two year, one person admitted to me he would take some rest before going back to work, so i guess not so many people would actually stop working (as the experiments show, overall).

So what about you ? Would you really stop working ? Or would you simply look for a way to create wealth accordingly to your own values and beliefs ? And if you think so, then wouldn’t it be a good idea to allow such a move in everyone’s life ?

There are many reasons that makes the basic income a good solution, from the end of extreme poverty, better redistribution of wealth and productivity gains, the inversion of the bargaining power in the society (to the civil society), and recognition of the non-market economy. I suggest you to read this text (here in greek) if you want to understand a bit more the vision of the society behind this proposal.

Again, i know this sounds crazy, utopist, or whatever reaction this raises for you. But doesn’t Greece need a new hope now ? Don’t protesters, occupyers, indignados, all over the world need a dream ? At least mine is technically feasible.

Now it’s up to you to embrace it, and make it a reality.

Stuck to the euro

"Despite everything, I remain in the eurozone" by Giannis Kalaitzis

Now I know what they did last summer

I just read a detailed account of the backstage negotiations during last Spring and the dramatic, for the EU and especially for Greece, months that followed. It’s a must read for anyone interested. It is the product of a Wall Street Journal investigation, based on more than two dozen interviews with euro-zone policy makers. It reveals how the currency union floundered in indecision—failing to address either the immediate concerns of investors or the fundamental weaknesses undermining the euro. The consequence was that a crisis in a few small economies turned into a threat to the survival of Europe’s common currency and a menace to the global economy. Enjoy the reading. It’s long, even though slightly reduced by me, so go get some coffee and a couple of cigarettes.

At a closed-door meeting in Washington on April 14, Europe’s effort to contain its debt crisis began to unravel.

Inside the French ambassador’s 19-bedroom mansion, finance ministers and central bankers from the world’s largest economies heard Dominique Strauss-Kahn, then-head of the International Monetary Fund, deliver an ultimatum.

Greece, the country that triggered the euro-zone debt crisis, would need a much bigger bailout than planned, Mr. Strauss-Kahn said. Unless Europe coughed up extra cash, the IMF, which a year earlier had agreed to share the burden with European countries, wouldn’t release any more aid for Athens.

The warning prompted a split among the euro zone’s representatives over who should pay to save Greece from the biggest sovereign bankruptcy in history. European taxpayers alone? Or should the banks that had lent Greece too much during the global credit bubble also suffer?

The IMF didn’t mind how Europe proceeded, as long as there was clarity by summer. “We need a decision,” said Mr. Strauss-Kahn.

The dispute at the Washington meeting divided two of the Continent’s grand old men, both of them born in 1942 and both among the fathers of the euro.

Wolfgang Schäuble, Germany’s ascetic and irascible finance minister, understood the IMF’s ultimatum. The euro zone would have to draw up a second bailout package for Greece by summer, just a year after a loan deal for €110 billion, or $140 billion.

But this time, Mr. Schäuble said, “We cannot just buy out the private investors” with taxpayer money. That would reward reckless lending, he said, and it would never get through an increasingly impatient German parliament. Greece’s bondholders would be required to lend more money, Mr. Schäuble proposed, rather than take payment for their bonds at maturity.

Jean-Claude Trichet, the urbane French head of the European Central Bank, warned against forcing bondholders to put in more money, which would effectively delay repayment. “This is not a good way to go in a monetary union,” Mr. Trichet said. “Investors would avoid all euro-area bonds.”

Mr. Trichet, in the twilight of a 36-year career as a finance official, feared that if Greece didn’t honor its bond debts on time, the implicit trust that kept credit flowing to many weak euro-zone governments would shatter. More countries and their banks would lose access to capital markets, in a chain reaction with incalculable consequences.

The April meeting ended inconclusively.

Meanwhile, the cost for fixing Greece was rising. The Athens government’s budget deficit was stuck at a stubbornly high level.

Italian and Spanish borrowing costs were still affordable and stable. The yield on Spain’s 10-year bonds hovered around 5.3%; on Italy’s, around 4.6%.

The debate over making bondholders contribute to the new funding package for Greece—known as private-sector involvement, or PSI—divided euro-zone countries.

Germany had allies. In the Netherlands and Finland, new governments had promised voters they wouldn’t pay for problems in less-frugal Mediterranean countries. Breaking those promises would risk rebellions in parliament.

But France joined the ECB in resisting burden-sharing by bondholders. France’s banks had lent more heavily than Germany’s to Greece and other indebted euro nations, and France fretted about a Lehman Brothers-style banking-system meltdown. Italian officials also feared that a precedent for losses in Greece would scare investors away from Italy’s bonds.

Three weeks after the Washington gathering, on Friday, May 6, panic erupted. German news weekly Der Spiegel reported that Greece was thinking of leaving the euro zone, with policy makers heading to a secret meeting that night in Luxembourg.

The report was half-right. There was a meeting, but Greece was staying put.

Inside a country chateau, top euro-zone officials told Greece’s finance minister they expected deeper austerity and faster reforms in return for a new aid package.

Then Mr. Schäuble said he wanted to discuss how bondholder burden-sharing would work. The usually smooth-mannered Mr. Trichet lost his patience. “I want to put my position on the record,” he said: “I don’t agree with private-sector involvement, so I won’t take part in a discussion about the practicalities.” He stormed out.

Mr. Trichet’s assent was vital. If the ECB were to stop accepting Greek bonds as collateral for its lending to banks on the grounds that the bonds were in default, then Greece’s banks, which were stuffed full of their government’s bonds, would quickly run out of cash and collapse. That would radically drive up the cost of a rescue.

In Greece, a new wave of mass strikes and demonstrations was starting. Protesters, angry about Europe’s imposition of extra spending cuts and tax hikes, clashed with police in front of the Athens parliament in the biggest and most violent protests in a year.

Spanish and Italian bond prices remained stable. But Europe was at a dangerous impasse over Greece.

Many euro-zone governments hoped Mr. Strauss-Kahn could find a way to relax the IMF’s summer deadline. The IMF chief was due to discuss the matter with German Chancellor Angela Merkel in Berlin on May 15, and with euro-zone finance ministers in Brussels the next day.

Mr. Strauss-Kahn couldn’t attend. Police in New York pulled him off his Paris-bound flight and charged him with sexually assaulting a hotel chambermaid. (The charges were later dropped, and prosecutors said they doubted the maid’s reliability.) An aide phoned Ms. Merkel at her central-Berlin home that Saturday and told her the news. The astonished chancellor responded with a German idiom that translates roughly as: “You couldn’t make this up.”

The IMF sent a lower-ranking official to Brussels in his place who had no latitude to deviate from the IMF’s deadline.

In Athens, meanwhile, a tent city of the “Indignant” protest movement—a groundswell of anger at the country’s impoverishment—sprang up outside parliament. Spain’s bond prices began to wobble as investors worried that other countries might also face debt restructuring.

On June 1, Mr. Schäuble’s deputy, Jörg Asmussen, presented a German plan at a meeting of finance officials in Vienna, at the Hofburg palace of the former Habsburg emperors. It involved pressuring Greece’s bondholders to swap their Greek debt for new IOUs that would come due far in the future. That would cut the amount of European taxpayer funding Greece would need.

After a meal in a palace banquet hall, the officials quarreled into the wee hours.

For the ECB, Mr. Trichet’s deputy Vitor Constâncio, of Portugal, denounced the German plan as “dangerous.” Credit-rating agencies would declare Greece to be in default on some of its debts—a so-called selective default. In that case, Mr. Constâncio warned, the ECB would refuse to accept Greek government bonds as collateral, dealing a death blow to Greek banks. France, Italy and Spain all supported Mr. Constâncio.

Germany’s Mr. Asmussen shot back with a threat of his own. Europe needed Germany’s money to fund a new program of Greek loans. “Without private-sector involvement,” he said, “there will be no program.”

Greece was descending into chaos. Embattled premier George Papandreou’s slender majority in parliament was fraying. On June 15, a swelling demonstration in Athens’s central square veered out of control.

Alone in his office, Mr. Papandreou phoned the parliamentary opposition leader and offered to make way for a national-unity government. Talks broke down, and the Greek government limped on badly wounded.

Even Ms. Merkel had some doubts about her finance ministry’s hard-line insistence that Greece’s bondholders take a loss. On June 17, she discussed a softer plan with French President Nicolas Sarkozy: a gentleman’s agreement under which Greek bonds would be honored but the bondholders would volunteer to buy new ones.

Mr. Schäuble pushed back. The veteran conservative politician was Berlin’s biggest supporter of the European dream, but he was also the keeper of Germany’s purse. He was determined to make banks share the burden with German taxpayers, and he didn’t trust them to keep a gentleman’s agreement.

When finance ministers met again on June 20, Mr. Schäuble pushed harder. Greece’s bondholders should be told not merely to accept a delay in repayment, he said, but also to forgive some Greek debt—a so-called haircut.

As Greece’s economy moved toward free fall, its debts were soaring beyond the country’s ability to pay, the Germans and their northern allies argued. Mr. Trichet and the southern countries resisted. Talks dragged on for hours. The ministers knew they couldn’t leave without some agreement.

They tried to please everyone: Greece would get more aid. Bondholder losses would be substantial, to placate the Germans, Dutch and Finns. But as the ECB insisted, they would avoid pushing Greece into selective default.

Investors knew you couldn’t have it both ways. As the threat of a Greek debt restructuring sank in, Southern Europe’s bond markets grew volatile. Spain’s 10-year bond yield rose above 5.6%. Italy’s reached 4.9%.

Greece’s parliament debated the extra austerity measures that Europe demanded. Central Athens erupted in violent protests. Anarchist youths tore up chunks of paving stone and threw them at riot police, who fired back with tear gas and stun grenades. Café parasols burned.

Europe hadn’t resolved how to keep Greece afloat. The IMF—whose demand for a decision had set off the whole argument—softened its ultimatum. IMF officials said they were satisfied that Europe would sort out some kind of new bailout, and wired Greece its summer aid payment on July 8.

It wasn’t enough to calm markets. Spain’s bond yield hit 6.3%. Italy’s rose to over 5.8%. Such borrowing costs, if sustained, would make it hard for both countries to rein in their debts.

The selloff in bond markets forced leaders to call an emergency summit for July 21.

Determined not to let the summit pass without an agreement, Ms. Merkel invited the French president, who objected to the German push for bondholder losses, to Berlin. The pair and their advisers met for dinner in the German chancellery the night before the meeting.

Few of them had time to touch the duck breast and vegetables on their plates as they searched for a compromise. Finally, Mr. Sarkozy said he would accept the private-sector involvement—if Ms. Merkel dropped her resistance to giving the euro-zone bailout fund broad new powers to buy debt of weak countries directly and move to protect such countries as Spain and Italy from bond-market contagion. Ms. Merkel agreed.

One more person needed to sign off. Ms. Merkel phoned Mr. Trichet at his Frankfurt office. He took the last Lufthansa flight to Berlin and arrived at the chancellery around 10 p.m.

Reluctantly, Mr. Trichet gave his OK. But he set conditions. Governments would have to insure Greek bonds against default so that the ECB could continue to accept them as collateral. And they would have to make plain that no other euro country but Greece would have its debts restructured.

The trio’s deal was both complicated and vague. Their staffs had little time to flesh out details before the next day’s summit in Brussels. As leaders trickled into the European Union’s boxy headquarters, Ms. Merkel faced a challenge to placate the euro zone’s south, which thought private-sector involvement was dangerous, and its north, which thought it didn’t go far enough.

When the leaders assembled at the sprawling summit table, Ms. Merkel admitted that the specter of bondholder losses was causing market unrest. But, she said, some Greek debt relief was essential. Without it, the bailout’s tough austerity conditions—made tougher by Greece’s missing its budget goals—would be seen as unbearable.

“If Greece had met its program parameters in April,” she snapped, “that would have helped.”

All 17 euro nations had to agree to private-sector involvement. But presented with a calculation that the plan would reduce Greece’s debt by only about €19 billion out of more than €350 billion total, Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte balked. If it’s only €19 billion, he said, “I’m out. I need more.”

Finnish premier Jyrki Katainen also complained. His parliament wanted collateral in exchange for more Finnish lending to Greece. “No collateral, no agreement from me,” he said.

Mr. Sarkozy was peeved. “All our parliaments can cause problems,” he said.

Then it was Slovakia’s turn. Prime Minister Iveta Radičová was fighting to keep her coalition together over aid for Greece—a richer country than her own. Adding more powers to the bailout fund “would be suicide,” she said.

Greece’s Mr. Papandreou pleaded for help. “If we can’t solve even Greece, we won’t be seen as being able to solve anything else,” he said.

Hours later, the leaders had a communiqué. To appease the holdouts, it left key points broad and noncommittal, offering the possibility of collateral to Finland and describing the complex bondholder deal in a few strokes, vague language that would return to haunt the bloc.

Officials struggled to explain the new Greek bailout and the bondholder losses. Amid the confusion, Mr. Rutte dispensed muddled numbers. Bank analysts put out flawed reports.

Investor confidence faltered as it became clear that Europe’s compromise achieved the worst of all worlds. Greece would be pushed into a historic default—the first time in nearly 60 years that a developed, Western country wouldn’t honor its debts. But the default was so small that Greece was still left with a crushing debt burden.

And then official Europe went on vacation: Ms. Merkel to the Italian Alps, Mr. Sarkozy to the French Riviera.

Bondholders didn’t. They went on a rampage.

This article was written by Charles Forelle and Marcus Walker. Stephen Fidler, David Gauthier-Villars, Sudeep Reddy and Brian Blackstone contributed to it.

Wall Street Journal also produced this documentary, called “Europe at the Brink” in which WSJ editors and reporters examine the origins of Europe’s debt crisis and why it spread with such ferocity to engulf much of the continent and threaten the entire world.

Information is Beautiful

The Myth of Sisyphus is a philosophical essay by Albert Camus. In it, Camus introduces his philosophy of the absurd: man’s futile search for meaning, unity and clarity in the face of an unintelligible world devoid of God and eternal truths or values. Does the realization of the absurd require suicide? Camus answers: “No. It requires revolt.” He then outlines several approaches to the absurd life. The final chapter compares the absurdity of man’s life with the situation of Sisyphus, a figure of Greek mythology who was condemned to repeat forever the same meaningless task of pushing a boulder up a mountain, only to see it roll down again. The essay concludes, “The struggle itself…is enough to fill a man’s heart. One must imagine Sisyphus happy.”

The Myth of Sisyphus from Wikipedia.

I’ve just bumped into a very creative contest which was organized by Guardian‘s Datablog and The Information is Beautiful Awards. Participants attempted to visualize aspects of the crisis in euro zone. I particularly observed in some of the projects the economic size and aesthetic influence of Greece. There were two main categories. The first was Design (for professional graphic designers).

Ready… Debt… Go! by Wayne Do Rego & Alex Seaton

The second one was Napkin (for amateurs). Anita Dembinsky used the myth of Sisyphus to show the possible vanity of the current solutions.

Is the Eurozone living the Sisyphus Myth? by Anita Dembinsky

Visit this page to see more of the entries and have an idea about how much better we could understand the economics of the crisis through such creative graphs.

A military coup in Greece: conspiracy or real threat?

I ‘ve just got an email from by Leonardo Bianchi, an Italian journalist and author of La Privata Repubblica, who has been reading this blog for quite some time. His question was whether all those references to a possible coup d’ etat in Greece are a real threat or simply a conspiracy chit-chat. After replying to him, I thought that more readers could have the same question so I decided to explain.

An important detail is to see who is the source of the reference to a military coup.

In Greece the majority of the mainstream media have been aligned with the government in this 2 year course of crisis & EU/IMF driven reforms. Since the beginning, decisions were taking only at the last minute and usually after some form of psychological blackmail to the public, which the mainstream media dutily reproduced in headlines. Greeks have a sad past with military dictatorships and the mere mentioning of the word shocks a lot of people (only 35 years ago there were people, now in their 50s or 60s, who suffered a lot because of our last dictatorship). So when the mainstream media mention such scenarios, I believe that their goal is to terrorize people, to shock them and make them accept anything (example, “if we get kicked out of eurozone, there will be chaos and possibly a dictatorship, so accept these new round of measures and save ourselves”). This methodology has worked repeatedly around the world (read The Shock Doctrine by Naomi Klein) and particularly during the past 2 years in Greece.

Foreign journalists of course have no reason to be part of this game. When they write of coups and tanks in the streets, I think they just want to write an interesting story and since it has been mentioned before as a possibility, they are legitimized (I guess) to reproduce it. Some of them have no clue of the seriousness of this claim (some have never visited Greece) but still, it’s catchy.
Now, whether I believe if it is a real threat, well, not really. I think we have a lot of crazy people in our military who might have thought it but the public today is more mature than in 1967 and it wouldn’t be so popular as then (back then, it was the cold war, the communist “threat” was something serious and the social mass could be controlled more easily). Plus, if an EU country would become a dictatorship, it would be immediately expelled from the EU with wider repercussions, not just for the country but also for the rest of the EU. For example, read about the British Army preparations for military action because of the eurozone crisis.
This is why I think it’s impossible (unless the wanna be dictators have the illusion that we need no one else in the world and that we can do it on our own for ever)